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.'^4^<^ A BS IB ACT
One <yf(3^the principal concerns of Government contract
administration is the proper control of change orders. They
are useful in resolving problems that would otherwise
inhitit the satisfactory completion of contracts, but tneir
overuse is an unnecessary drain on public funds. The
purpose of this thesis is to evaluate what effects bidders
of fixed-price Government construction contracts have on
contract prices when the level of competition intensity
increases. It is suggested that in a climate of intense
competition, the winners of bid awards are usually not only
willing to assume the risk of losing profits, but also are
willing to improve their financial positions through exces-
sive use of contract change orders. This premise is tested
against a sample of actual construction contract data from
the Western Division, U. S. Naval Facilities Engineering
Command. Several conventional measures of the level of
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^- INIBQDOCTION
The U. S. Government enters into a large number of
contracts with the private sector because it has an interest
in encouraging private action to accomplish its goals.
Contracts are written, agreed to, and executed with the
purpose cf fulfilling the needs of Government agencies. In
doing so, however, many contracts experience cost overruns
because of imperfect wording of contract provisions, tech-
nical difficulties experienced by contractors, changes in
Government cission reguirements, or other reasons.
Cne cause of cost overruns is the change order— a modi-
fication issued unilaterally by a Government contracting
officer directing the contractor to make changes within
certain regulatory limits. The change order is issued
during the life of the contract and usually directs certain
actions in exchange for compensation to the contractor. Ihe
intent of the change order is to benefit both the Government
and the private contractor in seeking eguitable solutions to
otherwise untenable situations. The change order is consid-
ered a tool of the Government to provide flexibility during
contract administration, but its value is fully realized
only when used with restraint. Contract managers sometimes
permit change order to be used excessively, especially when
they make liberal or lenient interpretations of change order
regulations and policies.
The contractor is motivated by the need to survive and
to make profits. It is understandable that changes to a
contract would be priced at a premium if the prices were
solely determined by the contractor, so payments for changes
are negotiated at what is considered to be "eguitable
adjustment."! Critics of Government overspending cite
instances of wasteful overruns on Government contracts as
testimony to the nismana gement of funds. It is the
Government's duty to use these funds strictly for the public
good. Since private concerns are subordinate to the public
good, the Government has an equal interest in assuring that
private individuals to not benefit at its expense.
The process of cost overruns may be exemplified in
Government construction contracting by significant nuirbers
of change orders. Construction contracting is uni>^ue
because virtually every facility differs from others in
terms of function and description. Whenever a new and
creative architectural concept is expressed in a set of
drawings and specifications, it is difficult to insure that
all the details are flawlessly coordinated.
This thesis will analyze problems associated with change
orders for construction contracts and attempt to identify
variables that significantly affect change order occurences.
The motivation of contractors is of primary concern in
determining whether they have been successful in attaining
profits and in improving their positions as a result of
overreliance on chances to contracts.
Chapter II provides a background for the concepts of
competitive bidding and contract change orders. A perspec-
tive of the bidding contractor is taken to examine his
motives and strategies prior to bidding. Several measures
of "level cf competitiveness" are introduced from bidding
theory literature that will be employed in the analysis
chapter cf this thesis. The means by which change orders
iThe determinant of what constitutes an "equitable
adjustment" has never been objectively qualified or quanti-
fied. It is construed in the ordinary meaning to connote a
"fair," "reasonable," "just," or "right" arrangement or
settlement.
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can te made are exanined. The general hypothesis of this
thesis is then presented after the reader is introduced to
these concepts.
Chapter III is the presentation and analysis of a ir.odel
constructed of actual data froni one of the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command's (NAVFAC) Engineering Field Divisions
(EFD) . Recently awarded construction contracts of Western
Division/ Naval Facilities Engineering Command (WESTDIV) are
analyzed using the concepts introduced in Chapter II,
Appendices A and B provide a description and listing of the
variatles used for the analysis.
Chapter IV summarizes the thesis and the findings
discovered in analysis. In addition, some general conclu-
sions are made which are either supported by the findings or
which attempt to explain inconclusive results. Finally,




1 . Competitive Eidding
The Department of Defense (DOD) is the largest
contracting agency ir the federal governmect/ with aniiual
awards running well over $100 billion in the early 1980 's.
By the end of the decade this figure is likely to double.
Congress and others concerned with federal spending and
accountability have paid particularly close attention to DOD
because most of this money is spent noncompetit ively . In
Fiscal Year 1981, of $105.2 billion worth of prime
contracts, only 7.6 percent of this money was involved in
competitively-awarded contracts [ Ref . 1: p. 106],
Ihis concern generated the creation of the Office of
Federal Erccurement Policy as an agency to prescribe regula-
tions and policies for federal procurement that would fester
Eore competitive pricing [Ref- 1: pp. 241-245]. The Federal
Budget in 1982 projected total government outlays for shore
facility construction and rehabilitation in excess of $30
billion [Ref. 2: p. 1]- The Navy Department's share of
this amount was approximately $830 million. 2 The Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) , which administers
most of this money, traditionally awards its construction
contracts on a competitive, lump-sum basis. Competitive
procurement then, is a consistent practice among the few.
2The Federal Budget projected this amount for Fiscal
Year 1982 Navy Department Military Construction outlays.
This included money for for active and reserve Navy and
Marine Corps components. It did not include construction
funded from other sources, such as Non-Appropriated Funds,
Defense Faiiily Housing, and Operations and Maintenance
appropriations.
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Competitive tidding, however has not escaped criti-
cism. Fcrmer General Counsel for the Department of the Navy
F. Trowtridge Vom Baur once argued during a Senate hearing
that fierce competition is not in DOD's interest because it
forces contractors to offer "tare bones" prices that could
cause them to go cut of business. As a result the
contractor, Vom Baur stated, is forced to find a way to
recover any foregone contingency for claims after the
contract is awarded. This could be done he claimed, as a
result of changes desired by the Government during the
performance of the contract work. Furthermore, he contended
that competitive procurement attracts only "marginal
producers" interested in low profit business. Referring to
complex systems procurement, he explained that claims would
occur more often when contracts are competed than when they
are negotiated. [Eef- 3: pp. 120-121]
A supporting argument is that the competitive
bidding process carries with it a heavy financial burden on
the Government and spawns some ridiculous practices,
"Competitive bidding causes government to be a bad customer
and, therefore, get bad treatment from the vendor." The
contractor is obliged to cut services where possible and act
particularly stingy and uncooperative when the contractor
learns that some significant feature or rec^uirement was left
cut of the original contract documents, [Eef. 4]
Ample testimony has been given to refute the criti-
cisms of competitive bidding [Eef. 5]- Senator Proxmire
challenged Vom Baur's statements with convincing counte-
rargument. Nevertheless, a competitively bid, fixed price
contract imparts more risk upon a contractor than any other
common form of contractual agreement. The "Changes" clause
in Government contracts was therefore adopted for the mutual
benefit of the contracting officer and the contractor
[Eef, 6: p. 38]-
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2. Ihe "Changes" Clause
Ihe concept that the Government should have the
right to order changes to the work, under a contract has been
a part of the Governnent contracting process for years. The
"Changes" clause (see Figure 2.1) gives the Government the
flexibility to purchase worx or effort directly froir an
existing contractor without the necessity of following the
statutes which rec;uire procurement pursuant to the formal
advertising method. Provided a change is "within the
general scope of the contract," a Contracting Officer may
bypass a great deal of administrative effort by negotiating
the cost of a work change directly with the original
contractor.
^
The "Changes" clause also serves a useful purpose in
allowing contractors a means of initiating changes when
errors in the drawings and specifications or special prob-
lems in site conditions are encountered. Some Government
officials have been concerned that a contractor can utilize
this clause as a vehicle for inproving his position under a
contract where a loss is beiny incurred either because of a
substantial underbid or a variety of other reasons. The
contractor is in a strong bargaining position knowing that
there will be no price competition. [Ref. 6; pp. 38-39]
A "Changed Conditions" clause was originally incor-
porated into the Armed Services Procurement Regulation
(ASPfi)* to discourage construction contractors from
3A change prder will be defined herein as a means of
ordering variations, changes, and additions to the work
under contract within the normal authority of the NAVFAC
Engineering Field Division. Tnerefore Supplemental
Agreements and change orders that, when added to existing
change orders on a contract, exceed one hundred percent of
the original contract price shall not be included. Field
EOICC's are not authorized by NAVFAC to exceed this
percentage.
*The ASPR, adopted in 19U7^ was replaced by the Defense
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STANDARD FORM 23A CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
CHANGES CLAUSE
CHANGES { 196.S FED;
(a) The Contractint; Otrictr may, at any time, without notice to the
sureties, by written order iicslt;natcd or indicated to be a change order,
make any chanpe in the work within the general scope of the contract,
including but nor limited to changes:
(i) in the specifications (including drawings and designs);
(ii) in the method or manner of performance of the work;
(iii) in the Government-furnished facilities, equipment, materials,
services, or site; or
(iv) directing acceleration in the performance of the work.
(b) Any other written order or an oral order (which terms as used
in this paragraph (b) shall include direction, instruction, interpretation
or determination; from the Contracting Ot'ticer, which causes any such
change, shall be treated as a change order under this clause, proiidcd
that the Contractor gives the Contracting Officer written notice stating
the date, circumstances, and source of the order and that the Contractor
regards the order as a change order.
(c) E.xcept as herein provided, no order, statement, or condua of
the Contracting OtTicer shall be treated as a change under this clause
or entitle the Contractor to an equitable adjustment hereunder.
(d) If any change under this clause causes an increase or decrease in
the Contractor's cost of, or the time required for, the performance of
any part of the work under this contract, whether or not changed by
any order, an equitable adjustment shall be made and the contract modi-
fied in writing accordingly; PrntideJ, houcter, That except for claims
based on defective specifications, no claim for any change under (b)
above shall be allowed for any costs incurred more than 20 days before
the Contractor gives written notice as therein required: And pmitded
further, That in the case of defective specifications for which the Gov-
ernment is responsible, the equitable adjustment shall include any in-
creased cost reasonably incurred by the Contractor in attempting to
comply with such defective specifications.
(e) If the Contractor intends to assert a claim for an equitable ad-
justment under this clause, he must, within 30 days after receipt of a
wrincn change order under (a) above or the furnishing of a wrirten
notice untier (b) above, submit to the Contracting Ofricer a written
statement setting forth the general narure and monetary extent of such
claim, unless this period is extended by the Government. The statement
of claim hereunder may be included in the notice under (b) above.
(f; No claim by the Contraaor for an equitable adjustment here-
under shall be allowed if asserted after final payment under this contraa.
Pigure 2. 1 Construction Contract Changes Clause,
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includiLg contingency allowances in bids for additional work
possitly experienced in handling subsurface materials. It
promised an equitable adjustment in contract price for addi-
tional work necessary to deal with unforeseen conditions.
It could he employed only where both contractor and
Government parties labor under a "mutual mistake of fact"
concerning estimates or beliefs involved. Therefore, it was
not the purpose of the Changed Conditions Clause to protect
a contractor from his own errors of judgment or calcula-
tions. [Eef. 7: p. 19]
In 1968, a slightly revised clause was adopted
dealing with "differing site conditions." This clause is
incorporated into the General Provisions for Construction
Contracts. In effect, this clause removes some risk from
the Governiient by providing for an adjustment decreasing the
price if the conditions are found to be better than
expected. "Differing Site Conditions" replaced the former
title "Changed Conditions" in the Standard Form 23-A
(Contract Provisions for Construction Contracts) to describe
more accurately the subject matter of the clause. [Eef- 8:
p. 205]
There is no question that the "Changes" clause has
been used for the purpose of improving the contractor's
position. The Government has several ways to protect itself
in this situation. The most common is to require adequate
proof of claimed increased costs [Eef- 6: p. 39]. In
general, the Goveriment is insulated from contract price
growth by explicit federal regulations binding contracting
parties and policies that discourage excessive change
orders.
Acguisiton Eegulation (DAE) , which has since been consoli-
dated into ana replaced by the Federal Acquisiton Eegulation
(FARi . The provisions for Changed Conditions, stated
withir, are still applicable as 10 U.S.C. 2301.
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^ • Change Ord er jBate
Ihe change crder rate is simply the percentage
increase (or decrease) in contract price over the original
award amount due to change orders. It is used specifically
in this research to assess the impact of price changes irre-
spective of contract size. It has the advantage of placing
all contracts under a normalized measure of performance.
Ihe corresponding disadvantage is that a given change crder
rate may have very different impacts on contracts of
contrasting size. This raises the question whether the
change order rate is a useful measure for assessing the
performance of contract administration. For example, a ten
percent increase in contract price for a small contract may
ie the result of one rather mundane change. A ten percent
increase for a large contract, however, probably is the
result of irore complex problems for the contractor. The
amount for these changes could involve complex construction
methods that affect ether portions of work, or the amount
could be an accumulation of many minor changes. A number of
small changes as opposed to a single larger one, has the
tendency to spread disruptive effects throughout many phases
of construction. This problem has been the subject of
claims made by contractors for "impact" costs created by a
"ripple effect," where a change disrupts the remainder of
the contract work [Ref. 9: p. 46].
Keeping contract change orders within ccntrclled
minimums is one of NAVFAC's goals [Ref. 10: p. C-109]- Any
realistic limit to change orders must be expressed as a
goal, net an absolute. Many change orders are valid and
prudent tools for accomplishing mission objectives. Ihey are
issued for various reasons, including correcting any errors
or omissions in plans and specifications. They give the
Government the flexibility to make convenient adjustments as
17
a result of inevitable errors^ oversights, and changes in
conditicns or requirements. Yet Government agencies have
heen accused of using change orders excessively [Ref. 11: p.
8]. Criticism has teen focused on proper or sufficient
actions hy Government Contracting Officers to:
• Ensure the correctness of contract documents prior to
the solicitation of the invitation for bids.
• Screen nonessential customer-requested change orders.
• Settle contract change order prices within reasonable
airounts during negotiations with contractors [Ref. 2:
pp. 9-14].
NAVFAC communicates specific management goals for
its sutordinate Engineering Field Divisions (EFD's) through
annual Command Management Plans (CMP) . In many cases, goals
are specifically tailored for each EFD. Under the Fiscal
Year 1984 Construction Program of the CMP, all EFD's are
subject to the same criteria for change orders:
• Keep all construction type change orders within six (6)
percent of their cumulative current year contract V'ork
in Places (WIP) while maintaining Military Construction
change order activity at five (5) percent.
• Keep unforeseen conditions orders^ within two percent of
the cumulative current year construction contract WI?.
• Keep design change orders'' within 1.5 percent of the
cumulative current year construction contract WIP.
[Eef. 10: p. C-109]
swork in Place refers to the dollar value of work
considered to be constructed in place by a contractor.
Progress payments are entitled to the contractor based upon
the determination of this value by the EOICC.
^CMS-coded (see Chapter III. A.I) change orders caused as
a result of underground obstructions, changed soil condi-
tions, unobserved site conditions and misstated underground
utility locations.
"'Change orders coded for design errors and omissions.
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Internal controls to stea the aJDuses criticized
above are incoi porated into NAVFAC directives.
Prep roc urement actions are carefully delineated in NAVFAC's
Contracting Manual (P-68) to assure comprehensive review of
contract documents prior to award. The negotiation of
change order prices requires an independent Government esti-
mate to re used as the basis for determining a reasonable
settlement. Customer-reg uested change orders must be
limited to "in scope" changes with the stipulation that
"desirability of the change and the fact that funds may be
available do not enter into determinations of scope"
[Eef. 12: p. 7-3.1.]. Before the construction plans and
specifications are disseminated to prospective contractors,
there are three stages of design review. The first two
stages are reviews by NAVFAC managers to insure that designs
and specifications are adequate for the intended ccnstruc-
tion. The last of these is a customer review to ensure that
a facility will meet the stated functional and mission
requirements [Eef. 13: p. 6].
E. CCNTEACTOR PIfiSPZCTIVE
1 . Eidding Stra teg y
Contractors, over the long run, are forced to bid
low enough to win, yet high enough to cover cost and make a
profit. Successful strategy then, as depicted in bid
theory, is to bid at a rate above cost that will yield the
greatest expected value, that is, the net of probability of
winning aultiplied by profit margin. As profit margins are
increased, the probability of winning is decreased. As a
contractor successively increments his profit margin in a
bid, he increases the probability that he will exceed the
bid of one of his coffipetitors--and therefore lose the award.
Presumably, an optimal profit margin exists where the
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corresponding probatility cf winniiig an award yields the
greatest ex^:ected profit [Bef. 14: pp. 488-490].
The contractor's first prerequisite for making
profits is to win a bid. In the short run, a contractor may
te compelled to use a low bid strategy that virtually
assures his chances cf winning. The amount of his winning
bid can seem quite illogical to other competitors. A common
occurrence that has frustrated many contractors is that many
of the bids submitted on all types of projects appear to be
below reasonable costs. In one particular observance,
nearly 80 percent of the bids on ail major jobs were at less
than the engineer's estimate, ^ some even at less than half
the engineer's estimate [Eef- 15: p. 127]. In Government
contracting, the mandatory independent estimate of project
costs is an average cost only. In contrast, bids of rival
firms on contracts represent opport unity costs for their
resources. Each rival firm has the option to choose these
contracts that are tie most advantageous to them in teres of
their special qualifications. These low bids are indicative
of marginal costs. A Government estimate cannot be
contractor specific, that is, representing the cost of
performing a particular project or job for one specific firn
[fief- 16: p. 214].
It is advantageous for the contractor to consider
the following in choosing a job so that he will have a
likely chance of winning:
=^ • Size. Usually the larger the job, tne fewer will be
the number of competitors. This increases the prob-
ability of winnirg. Adversely, the larger the esti-
mate, the greater the risk that the estimate will be
8The independent estimate made by the architect-engineer
as an agent of the cwner. For Government contracting the
parallel is the Goveinjnent estimate.
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inaccurate. larger construction projects tend to
involve more unconventional construction methods and
have many interrelated activities. Estimators are
more i:rone to errors and oversights in determining the
costs for these methods or activities. Smaller johs
may be more attractive to contractors as they can be
the foundation for invaluable contacts and reputation
for later, more profitable eventualities— a form of
advertising.
^- Care and attention required. A smaller organization
may te more successful in performing work on a job
that requires mere attention to detail than could be
provided by a large, iigh-overhead company.
c- Profit advantage. Several jobs concentrated in one
locality offer inherent advantages. Economies of
scale can be realized for labor, materials, and super-
vision. Improved labor relations and productivity,
price discounts for bulk purchases, and improved
time-saving and coverage of supervision and management
result.
^- Continui ty of em ploy ment . Steady employees earn their
pay more productively. Once the maximum yearly
contribution to the Social Security tax (FICA) has
been made by the contractor, the balance stays with
the contractor as a distinct accrual to his job
return.
e. labor co nditions. Jurisdictional disputes may involve
a contractor's workforce and result in wage increases.
f. Subco ntracting . The reaction and bid of the subcon-
tractor can be important. If the contractor can be
assured of obtaining low subbids from reliable sutccn-




9- Figaiicial solvency. The competitive edge may be
determined by the ability to finance construction
between progress payments, procure construction and
payment bonds, and take advantage of trade discounts
for prompt payment.
h. Competition. The greater the number of competitors,
the lower the contract price must be to win the award.
A decrease in price below a certain point makes oppor-
tunities elsewhere more favorable, [Eef. 17: pp.
81-86]
i« Seasonal considerations. Some contractors disregard
overhead and equipment costs and bid low upon reaching
a certain volume of work during an operating year.
J- Desperation. When a contractor is in a financial
position where money is urgently needed to pay bills,
any source, including jobs at a loss, can prolong
survival in business [Ref. 15: pp. 187-188]. When
faced with a choice of giving up his capital to avoid
going deeply into debt, a contractor will assume a
great amount cf risk just to stay in business.
[Ref. 18: p. 154]
There is an intuitive reason to suspect that a
winning bid is occasionally submitted by a poorly-informed,
irresponsible bidder. The poorly-informed bidder cannot
expect tc make a positive profit since his bid must undercut
an amount very close to the project's "true value" in order
to win. The "true value" is a theoretical estimate of what
the project should cost, after all biases for misjudgment of
costs, unreasonable contingency amounts, and greed are
removed. The poorly-informed bidder, in order to make any
profit at all, must bid within a very narrow interval
betweeen this "true value" and the maximum-informed bidder's
amount. More likely, his winning bid will be below the
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"true valu€." This phencmenon is referred to as the
"winner's curse;" the individual to whom a contract is
awarded tends to be the one who most underestimated the true
value of the work [Eef. 19: p. 133]. In higher-risk
contracts, the Government might award the contract to a
contractor of questionable financial stability, tut who
cannot be classed as irresponsible.^ Reputable contractors
would avoid such high-risk, lump-sum contracts, because they
would expect to be underbid by contractors who fail to see
risk or who desire such risk [Eef. 18; p. 154].
All contractors must face risk. Risk includes all
exposures to loss brought about by nature, organizational
shortcomings or outside influences. Some of these are: (1)
weather, (2) unexpected job conditions, (3) personnel prob-
lems, (4) delays in caterial deliveries, (5) labor strikes,
(6) faulty materials, (7) faulty workmanship, (8) operating
problems (additional expenditures for increased supervision,
damage to etjUipment through overloading or poor mainte-
nance), and (9) natural disaster.
Successful bidding strategy would seem to involve a
careful synergism between assumption ox risk and assessment
of competition. A misjudgment of the former is likely to
result in a disasterous financial consequence. Misjudgment
of the latter will likely result in loss of the award.
2 . Mea sur ing the Inte nsity of Competition
A sharp increase in construction industry unemploy-
ment occurred in the spring of 1980 (see Figure 2.2). The
industry recession prompted contractors to be much more
competitive as demonstrated by contractor practices in
soliciting business en a national rather than strictly local
^If considered a "i;espo nsitle" bidder, a gontr^ctcr is
entitled to award providea he is also a responsive bidder.
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scale, bidding on new types of woek, and bidding acre
projects. Officers of several reputable firms lamented that
in order to win, profit margins in bid estimates had to be
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Figure 2.2 Construction Onemployment Fiscal Years 77-82-
The level of competition for a particular contract
can be measured in at least three ways. First, the spread,
or difference between the low bid and the second low bid,
measures the amount cf money "left on the table" and indi-
cates how Euch higher the low bidder could have been and
still taken the award. As the number of bidders increases,
the percentage spread decreases [Ref- 21: p- 1382]. Second,
the ratio of the winning bid to the Government estimate can
be used. . A ratio near one would indicate firms bidding near
average costs while a lower ratio would indicate more
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competitive opportunity costs £Ref- 16: p. 214]. The third
measure, the expected number of bidders, can he appxied
where it is necessary to decrement one's markup margin (in
order to win) as more competitors respond to the invitation
for bids [Ref. 16: p. 213].
Ihe spread can be normalized for contracts of
varying sizes by expressing it as a percentage of difference
tetween the lowest and second lowest bids. Ihe
bid-tc-Gcvernmen t estimate ratio is already normalized and
the number of bidders does not appear to be significantly
related to the size ci a contract. [Ref. 16: p. 217]
An analysis conducted for a large general contractor
illustrates that winning bids are based en opportunity
costs. Over a two year period, 35 percent of all competi-
tors* bids were below this contractor's estimated direct
"out of pocJcet" costs of performing the work. This
contractor was still able to compete successfully among
other reputable firms, and his estimates closely reflected
his actual costs of operation. Two-thirds of all bids
submitted by his competitors fell between 91 and 120 percent
of his direct job cost. To be assured a 50 percent prob-
ability of winning each award, the contractor would have had
to bid belcw construction cost, or at a negative profit.
[Ref. 15: pp. 127-128]
^- Con tra ctor Dis like s for Chang;e Orders
Many contractors contend that change orders are
unprofitable [Ref. 22; p- 314]. They complain that they
require great effort to price and then take considerable
time to get approved and processed [Ref. 23: p. 8]. Ihe
implementation of changes results in a dilution of top
supervision on original contract work. Too much time of key
individuals is spent arranging for changes and pricing and
negotiating them [Ref. 9: p. 46].
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This sentiment may partially explain why complaints
arise frcni the Governnient that chanje orders are priced too
highly ty ccntractors. The contractor attempts to account
for unknown costs which he fears may occur, while Government
estimators may have an unrealistic understanding of actual
costs involved in certain operations, particularly the low
productivity of direct labor as a result of changes, delays,
and uncertainties [Eef. 9; p. 47]. Those contractors averse
to change orders should be logically in favor of contracts
that limit the amount of damages entitled to the contractor,
some contract administrators argue [ Ref . 24: pp. 97-98]-
If the Government is lenient in permitting compensation to
contractors for disputed matters where liability is gues-
tionatle, then disreputable contractors will benefit. Ihe
disreputable contractor, who relies on these compensations,
will underbid honest contractors. Limitation of liability
clauses in a contract would stem the practice of bidding low
and seeking to recoup losses at a later date [Bef. 24:
pp. 97-98].
The additional financial burden of performing change
orders may be unaffordable to the contractor who is in a low
cash position. The contractor also must deal frequently
with "cons tructi ve" 1 change orders, which are informal tut
have the effect of eroding profits. A contractor may incur
losses on a contract unknowingly, suspecting that there are
deficiencies in his accounting system. The real problem may
be unidentified constructive change orders [Eef. 25: pp.
5-6 ].
lOAn oral or written act or omission by the Contracting
Officer or other authorized Government official which is of
such a nature that it is construed or inferred to have the
same effect as a formal written change order under the
"Changes" clause.
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^- Cod tractor Preferences for Change Orders
Since the Government reserves the right to issue
"in-scope" changes to the provisions of a contract, the
contractor is within his rights to demand equitable adjust-
ments for additional costs anticipated in associated extra
work. If a change reduces the amount of work under
contract, the Government, too, is usually entitled to
consideration through a reduction of contract price. U . S.
Navy contracts ordinarily permit a limit of six percent
profit for changes negotiated pursuant to the "Changes"
clause [Eef. 12: p. 7.3. U]. Ihe claim that Government esti-
mators of change order prices have been too reliant upon
contractor estimates during negotiations [Eef. 11: p. 28],
raises the question whether this profit limit has been
frequently circumvented. Furthermore, the profit that might
have teen realized through these changes may have been of
sufficient aoaount to improve many contractors* faltering
financial positions.
Ihe practice of trying to obtain a contract award by
knowingly offering a price less than anticipated costs, with
the expectation of increasing the price during performance
through change orders, is referred to as "buying in." This
is generally deemed to be irrational bidding behavior for
contractors, except for large, multibillion-dollar firms
that depend upon traditional growth in defense "state of the
art" programs [Eef. 1: p. 106]. But "buying in" may not
seem so irrational if viewed as a two-part strategy. Behind
the low bid could be a "bail-out," or contingent escape
strategy. A "bailout" is a loophole which allows the bidder
to recoup losses. Ihe "bail-out" can even be perpetrated
with the help of the Government by .accepting whatever the
contractor can deliver, even if it is a cheaper or substan-
dard product. After all, it is reasoned, the 'public
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disclosure that a very low bid has been accepted could be
ultimately embarrass irg to Government officials. Either a
deductive change order or termination of contract, which
would have the effect of minimizing the contractor's losses,
could be a satisfactory compromise for both parties
[Ref. 26: pp. 84-87].
C. THE QUEST FOB PBCFIT THRODGH CHANGE ORDERS
The potential to profit from any change order depends
upon many factors. Among the most prominent of these is the
type of change order. The Defense Audit Service, in a 1982
audit [Ref. 11: p. 8], attributed 73 percent of DOD cnange
orders tc three causes. Slightly over half of the change
orders they found were due to deficiencies in designs and
specifications; ten percent resulted because specifications
and designs had not been completed before the basic
contracts were awarded; and about eleven percent of the
change orders were the result of user rec/uests for changes.
Value engineering changes were not cited as a significant
cause of change orders, but they are very attractive for
enhancing ccntractor profitability.
1 • Custom er Reguests
It is difficult to predict customer-reguested change
orders since they are implemented either in response to
unpredicted changes in mission requirements, or in as a
result of inadeguate planning. They can be generated as a
real facility need or as a compromise or exchange for
facility features no longer required. It has been an
implicit policy of NAVFAC to accomodate the customer's
desires for such changes [Ref. 11: p. 19]. If the
contractor is bound by a set of explicit specifications and
drawings, the custoEer- requested change order may be one of
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the final avenues for opportunity profits. An indicator of
contractor motive here would be seen by suggestions for
changes made by the contractor directly to the facility
user.
2. Ambiguities of Contract Documents
Ihe most overt evidence of contractor motive to
benefit through change orders has been seen in the litiga-
tion of disputes over contract documents. Considerable
legal precedent in establishing the conditions through which
a contractor may benefit from contract ambiguities has
evolved in the courts. A number of landmark cases clearly
shows that toth Government and contractor parties cannot use
unilateral interpretations of contract language to benefit
at the expense of each other. Since the majority of change
orders are caused by mistakes in the preparation of contract
documents^ this is the most fertile ground for seeking extra
compensation. Ordinarily the contractor relies on the
implied suitability cf Government plans and specifications
for their intended use [Eef- 27: p. 1076]. But a contrac-
tor's interpretation of contract language may differ from
that cf the Government's due to some degree of ambiguity
caused by imperfect wording/ conflicting statements or
depictions, or connotated meanings. The legal system has
tested many cases involving contract ambiguities and has,
as a result, produced two counterbalancing, risk allocation
principles: the rule of contra Eroferentum, which adopts
the interpretation that favors the non-drafting party
(contractor) and the rule of pre-contract clarification,
which denies adoption of a contractor's interpretation when
he has failed to reguest clarification of an ambiguity of
which he knew or should have known [Ref. 27: pp. SgS-SS^i].
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a. Legal Precedent Favoring the Contractor
Courts have generally been sympathetic to
contractors when inaccurate or incomplete informaticr. in bid
packages result in urexpected costs. In Peter Kievit Sonsj;_
Com£an_y v. United States, 109 Ct , CI. 390 (1947), the Court
of Claims held:
Where cne of the parties to a contract draws the docu-
ment and uses therein language which is susceptible of
more than one meaning, and tne intention of the parties
does net otherwise appear, that meaning will be given
the document which is more favorable to the party who
did not draw it. Ihis rule is especially applicable to
Governirent contracts when the contractor has nothing to
say as to its provisions. [Eef- 6: pp. 231-232]
In WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. Unite d States, 16 3
Ct. CI. 1, 323 P. 2d 874 (1963), and Blount Brothers
Construction Co. v. United States, 17 1 Ct. CI. 478, 346 F.2d
962 (1965), the Courts ruled that where an ambiguity was
"subtle, not blatant" and where the contractor is genuinely
misled and not deliberately seeking to profit from a recog-
nized error by the Government, relief is entitled to the
non-drafter [Ref. 28: p. 152]- Furthermore, in Ghclscn,
Byars and Holmes Construction Co. v. United States, 17 3 Ct.
CI. 374, 351 F.2d 987 (1965), the Court ruled that there is
no duty to seek clarification where a contractor inrccently
construes a subtle ambiguity in his favor. Equally impor-
tant, if clarification is not provided to an ambiguity
sought by a contractor, the Government will be held to have
waived its right to complain of the interpretation placed on
the contract by the contractor [Eef- 29: pp. 154-155].
Under the rule of pre-contract clarification,
the contractor is obligated to inquire about major patent
discrepancies, obvious omissions or drastic conflict in
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provisiop.s. In a case where the distinction between a
patent and latent aabiguity was an issue, the Board of
Contract Appeals in Worsham Construction Co., lll£- » X«
Ulliif^ States, GSBCA 5469, refused the Government invocation
of the "patent ambiguity" rule as a means of preventing
contractor recovery for a defective specif icaticn.
[Ref. 30: pp. 9-10]
t. Legal Precedent Favoring the Government
The rule cf pre-contract clarification is a rule
of fair dealing which protects the Government from a
contractor who intentionally submits a low bid with the goal
of claiming ambiguities during contract performance to
obtain price increases. In Beacon Construction Co. v.
United States, 16 1 Ct. Cl- 1, 314 F.2d 501 (1963), the
contractor failed to notify the Government of an ambiguity
and interpreted the contract in its own favor. The
contractor sought tc recover expenses after performing the
work where the contract language was vague. The Court
denied relief to the contractor, holding that such a claim
was made without pretest and in absence of direction from
the Government [Ref. 6; p. 234]. Where a conflict in
contract documents exists and is known to the contractor,
relief will be denied tne contractor when he assumes the
right to disregard the affected portions and apply his own
remedy. The Court stated in S.O.G. of Arkansas v. United
States, 212 Ct - Cl . 125, 19 G.C. (1976), that this action is
taken to avoid post-award disputes of the type which arose
here by encouraging contractors to seek clarification before
anyone is legally bound [Ref. 31: pp. 3-4].
The pre-ccntract clarification rule also applies
to circunstances where a reasonable or experienced bidder
should be capable .of recognizing a patent or glaring
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discrepancy. In Wickham Contracting Co. v. United St ates ,
212 Ct. CI. 318, 546 F. 2d 395 (1976), a contractor
submitted a bid based on an erroneous drawing scale. The
court ruled tJaat the use of the erroneous scale was so
unusual that it created a patent discrepancy [Ref- 27: fp,
1074-1078]. Siniiliarly, in J. S. Bajteson Co., Inc. v.
115:41 ed States, GSBCA 1221; E. ^, Hollingshead Ccr_£. v.
United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 681, 683, 111 F. Supp. 285, 286
(1953); and others, the Courts generally agreed that:
An experienced contractor cannot rely on government-
prepared specifications where. on the basis of the
government furnished data, he knows or should have known
that the prepared specifications could not produce the
desired result for '. . . he has no right to make a
useless thing and charge the customer for it.' rfief, 27:
p. 1079]
c. Misrepresentation
A contractor might receive relief or avoid the
commitment to a contract if he is misled by a false repre-
sentation or nondisclosure of terms in the bidding package.
Although such action is usually not indicative of a contrac-
tor's motive to gain through changes to a contract, it
provides recourse for a low bidder to escape an unprofitable
dilemma. A Contracting Officer must be careful that he is
not on constructive notice of an error where a mistake in
bid is alleged after award of contract. If a low bid is
significantly lower than other competing bids or the
Government estimate, the contractor may avoid commitment to
the terms of the contract ordinarily established under the
firm bid rule^i if he can demonstrate that the Contracting
iiUnder the firm bid rule in Government contracting, the
bidder cannot, in the absence of special circumstances,
withdraw or revise a bid at the time of bid opening.
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Officer had "constructive knowledge" of a mistaken bid.
[Ref. 32: pp- 152-153]
^- I^lJ^S Engineering
Value Engineering changes are unique in that they
tend to irairtain the essential function of a facility while
creating cost savings for both the Government and the
contractor. Provided that a facility's "essential function"
is retained intact, a Value Engineering change will deflate
the change order rate and increase contractor profitability.
In fixed-price NAVFAC contracts, the contractor's share of
savings is determined by subtracting Government costs
(resulting from developing and implementing the change) from
contract savings and multiplying the result by 55 percent.
Ihe Value Engineering provision is applicable to contract
prices of $100,000 ci more £Eef. 33]. Obviously it is an
attractive alternative to consider for the change-minded
contractor.
E. GENEEAL HYPOTHESIS
It has been stated that contractors are compelled in
competitive situations to bid very close to their expected
costs cf construction. They are motivated in some cases to
win as a preferable alternative to having no business at
all, even if it means operating at a loss. Winners of
competitively-bid contracts are either those who enjoy the
relative advantages of economies of scale or proprietary
properties, or are willing risk-takers. Risk-takers are
those who accept the probability of setbacks in the course
of construction. «ore likely they probably believe that
they can recoup profits later. Although there are many
reasons that a prudent contractor would chose tc avoid
change orders, they are nonetheless inevitable. It is the
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premise of this paper that there is a link between the cost
of change orders to a contract and the degree of competi-
tiveness under which that contract was bid. As bidding
competition increases, those bidders who are more amenable
to the risk of seemingly unprofitable ventures and are
willing to gamble on change order dynamics displace the more
conservative and reputable contractors.
The contractor can use a number of different change
order types to his benefit. Among these are customer-
requested changes, changes to correct mistakes and ambigui-
ties in contract docunents, changes to account for differing
site conditions, and Value Engineering changes. Value
Engineering changes have been shown to be a relatively small
proportion of federal construction contract administration
effort. If these contractors as described are typically
successful bidders, then higher change order rates among
contracts that are bid under strong competitive conditions
should be systematically evident. Empirical data will be
used in a model to test the following conclusions;
• A direct relationship exists between change order rate
and degree of competition— measured by number of
bidders, the "spread," bid/Government estimate ratio,
bid/mean bid ratio, and deviation of winning bid fiom
mean bid.
• Eelationships exist among various classifications of
construction contract change order rates according to:
(1) timing of the contract award, (2) contract size, (3)
geographical area, (4) type of facility, and (5)
construction industry unemployment rate-
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III. METHODOLOGY
A. DEVEIOPINS THE DilABASE
1 . Gen era l
Ihe data for the research were collected at the
Western Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, San
Brunc, California (WZSTDIV). Only construction contracts
that were formally-advertised and fixed-price are included
for analysis. These contracts were WESTDIV administered
—
that is, advertised and awarded through WESTDIV or its
authorized agents at WESTDIV-designa ted geographical loca-
tions. Therefore, construction contracts awarded ty local
Officers-in-Charge of Construction (OICC's) of more limited
contracting authority at 2 remote "field" offices are not
included. 12 xhe data were extracted from two sources;
• The Construction Management System (CMS) , a subsystem
ccrtained in the AMAL GAMAN/Integrated Disbursing and
Accounting Data Ease Master maintained by the Naval
Facilities Support Office (FACSO)
,
The information
provided was extracted from the CMS system for the
author. The data were transcribed from computer print-
outs into the statistical computer program to be used
for the analysis in this chapter.
i^Navy Civil Engineer Corps officers assigned as Public
Works Officers at Naval activities usually are assigned
concurrently (dual authorities are vested in one person) as
field OICC's. As a field OICC, contracting authority is
more limited than that of the Commander of the Engineering
Field Division (WESTDIV). Since field OICC contract bidding
data are maintained locally at these remote offices ana
their collection was considered infeasibie within the time
constraint for research, they are excluded from analysis.
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• CcirpletGd Scales of Bid Offers for Construction
Contracts (12ND WESTDIV Form 4330/24) maintained by the
H€ad, New Procurement Branch (Code 02 1) of the
Acquisition Department. This information was provided
by hardcopy listings of individual contract Government
estimate and bid-opening results.
2- ^ata Set Definitio n
The model for analysis is established within the
following considerations:
• Availability of bidding information.
• Recentness of information.
• Consistency in management policies concerning contract
admiristration.
• Completion (closecut) of contract.
• U.S. Navy funding sources (appropriated and non-
appropriated) only.
Ihe major restriction for data analysis is imposed
by availability of biddirg information. Although CMS
affords the opportunity to review award amounts and change
order information for contracts of all appropriation sources
and Engineering Field Divisions of NAVFAC, the extraction of
information for bidding data and government estimates^^ is
cumbersome. Accordingly, only WESTDIV contracts awarded
from Fiscal Year 1978 to the present have been included. i*
This does afford relative currency of information. Fiscal
Year 1983 data is excluded, however, due to (1) the small
i^Government estimates for contracts are available in
another subsystem of the AMALGAMAN Data Base, but they are
not tailored as necessary to reflect the actual estimate for
the base bid plus or minus the additive or deductive bid
items that actually night have been awarded.
I'^Scales of Bid Offers are maintained at WESTDIV for six
years until disposal. Coi ncidentally, data for completed
contracts were implemented into CHS at the approximate
starting point for this same period (1977) .
36
proportion of completed contracts available and (2) revision
of WESTDIV policies in (a) "downloading" many contracts to
field OICC's (WESTDIV was authorized increases in manpower
levels for field offices, so many contracts, especially
C.Mi^-f und€d, were delegated in 1983 to OICC's to administer),
(b) accelerating the execution of ^^ESTDIV contracts award
phase and (c) encouraging other forms ox modifications to
contracts, such as Supplemental Agreements. Items (b) and
(c) above were internalized in Fiscal Year 1983 t^ESTDIV
management objective plans.
All considered contracts must have been "closed out"
or completed, so that the change order rate is reflected as
a final, static figure, rather than a dynamic one as under a
contract-in-progress . This constraint is imposed so that
all influences of contract price expansion during the life
cycle of the contracts have matured.
Funding sources are limited to Military
Construction, Navy (I^CON) and Non-Appropriated Funds (NAF)
contracts in excess of $200,000, and Operations and
Maintenance, Navy (OMN) contracts in excess of $2500. This
constraint is arbitrary. The intent is to view the inci-
dence cf construction change orders under one service branch
(Navy), so that as much consistency in the attitudes and
policies of making change orders could be ensured. This
would avoid any possible biases by NAVFAC managers. The
$200,000 floor on MCCN and NAF contracts reduces the size of
this study's data base to a workable^s number and eliiiiinates
many mixed-funding source contracts. i^ These contracts
i^Initially it was estimated that inclusion cf many
smaller MCON contracts would overload the storage capacity
of the MINITAB computing system used for statistical anal-
ysis.
i^Many construction contracts are funded by a mix of
more than one source— for example, MCON and OMN dollars are
commonly used under one contract for building alterations
37
represent a relatively small proportion of tLe total amount
of "-ICCN and OMN funds administered by NAVFAC and therefore
should net significantly bias the results of analysis.
3 • Eg fining the Data
The data considered within the above constraints
possess a number of clear outliers that, if included in the
analysis, would distort overall values for change order
pricing and bid averages. The following types of WESTDIV
contracts are further excluded:
• Contracts terminated early, where the majority of
construction dollars are not consumed or "in place."
Otherwise the change order rate would appear as a large
deductive (negative) one. A small number of contracts
are terminated for convenience of the Government if the
facility or some of its features are no longer re-juired.
A contract may also be terminated for default when the
contractor fails to make satisfactory progress in
construction or breaches the terms of the contract.
• Contracts for which costs listed in CMS do not account
for the majority of the award amount. Presumably, ether
phases of construction had not yet been reported as
completed or consisted of work funded under a separate,
unreported source.
• Construction contracts for Adak, Alaska, under WZSTEIV's
cognizance; these contracts suffer from restrictive
competition and unique logistics at an isolated
location.
A total of 473 completed i^lCON, NAF , and CMH
construction contracts awarded from October 1977 through
September 1982 were listed on the CMS printouts as of 15
(MCON) and repairs (Cf^N) when the construction features for
each fundirg source are clearly separated.
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February 1984. Of these U7 were deleted for the reasons
stated above. Another 126 contracts for Fiscal Years 1980
and 1981 were excluded because their corresponding Scales of
Bids were not available. There remained 300 contracts for
analysis. Table I summarizes the distribution of these
contracts.
TABLE I







DOLLAE Mil YEAR TOTAL
lin~$T0'(7ar
CMN MCON NAF OMN MCON NAF
1978 6 43 4 $ 868 7211 1 2453 $ 75432
1979 28 76 6 6295 142980 5008 154283
1980 14 14 2 5741 31S17 688 38246
1981 1 12 **^ 255 17645 56 9 16469
1982 60 28 4 14932 30279 1713 46 924
TOTAL 109 173 18 28091 294832 1043 1 $ 333354
4 . Summarization and A ssum£tions
Appendix A describes the variables provided for each
WESTDIV contract by the Construction Management System and
the Scales of Bids. Appendix B tabulates these data.
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a. Assumpticrs
C) Geographical Categorization.. To isolate
the effects of geographical differences in climate, economy/
employment rate, and ether factors, the contracts are clas-
sified among eight general categories. Four of these
pertain to major U. S. Naval activity concentrations, while
the ether four are classified as "rural" areas in the
outlying vicinity of these concentrations. Generally these
"rural" activities lie more than 50 miles or convenient
commuting distance from San Diego, Los Angeles, San
Francisco or Sea ttle/Eremer ton.
(2) Numter of Bids. It is apparent that some
hids appearing on the Scales of Bids were disproportionately
high as compared to either other competitors or the
Government estimate. These bids would only distort values
(such as standard deviation and mean bid) calculated for
analysis [Eef. 21: pp. 1377-1378]. These are considered
nonserious or "noise" bids and are typically excluded in
studies of auctions and bidding models [Ref. 19: p. 126].
An appropriate algorithm for identifying these bids depends
upon the model, and there appears to be no definite rule for
determining them. Therefore, any bid greater than 150
percent of the competitive mean bid was arbitrarily consid-
ered a "noise" bid by the author and was extracted. This
adjustment was made to 54 bids on 43 contracts. It was
observed that some bidders consistently submitted "noise"
bids. Comnon reasons for unreasonably high bid prices may
fall into one or more of the following categories [Eef. 34:
p. 127] :
• Complementary bidding. The bidder is not interested in
performing the subject work, yet does not want to be
otherwise prevented from bidding on future projects or
to be deleted from future Bidder's Lists. The proposed
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price is inflated to a range that will prevent likely
award.
• Bidder error. Mistakes simply may be made when calcu-
lating tid prices.
• Bidder ffiisunderstanding of the scope of the work.
• Perceived risk on the part of the bidder. Any number of
factors may cause the bidder to perceive real or imagi-
nary areas of risk and to raise his bid price to provide
for this risk.
• Ihe bidder may be quite uncertain about the proposed
work, the Govercment' s particular requirements of the
contractor, or his ability to perform as expected.
(3
)
Next Lowest Bidde r^s Price an d Spread
.
The next lowest bidder's price and the spread are included
for analysis to examine any significant relationships
between change order rate and intensity of competition.
Chapter II. E. 2. cites the significance of these data in bid
analysis.
(4) The Number of Chancj_e Orders. The number
per contract of dollar- valued change orders is analyzed to
determine the effect it has on the change order rate. Some
change orders are "no-cost" and do not directly affect the
change order rate. Among the dollar-valued change orders
are amounts either added to, or deducted from, the contract
price. This variable is of no value for predictive
purposes, it is noted, since it cannot be known at the time
of bid opening,
(5) Low Bid/Mean Bid Deviation. The deviation
of the low bid from the mean bid can be expressed as a
measure of the number of standard deviations that lie
between the low bid and mean bid on a given contract. It
conveniently normalizes all contracts regardless of award
amount. A comparatively high value here is an indication of
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an unusually deviant tid. But the value of a standard devi-
ation is diminished for very small population sizes, so this
measure is used only en contracts where there were at least
four bidders. Analysis is focused on the determination of
any relationships between this value and the change order
rate.
(6) "Equivalent" Change Order Rai^« ^
contract change order is fre^^uently intended as a means of
correcting a deficiency or mistake or maKing an "ir scope"
change that is more accomodating to the facility user.
Frequently, a specific feature of a final facility after
change orders is not that which was originally intended at
the award of contract. In many cases, some facility
features are no longer needed or are substituted by an
equivalent "in-scope" alternative. These changes do not
alter the function of the facility, but they do alter the
contract price, and usually at a lower cost. Adding the
amount of deductive change orders back into the contract
price reflects more accurately what the contract would have
cost if the original features were left intact. While this
is not necessarily an accurate assumption for all deductive
change order situaticns, it is believed to provide a more
conservative comparison of contracts in the context of
"dollar's worth" of construction. J^alue engineering change
orders are not added back into the contract price, because
this kind of change order actually reduces the contract
price without "impairing essential functions or characteris-
tics." The basic criterion for deducting the "equivalent"
change crder, as contrasted with leaving the Value
Engineering change crder intact, is in the consideration
given to the Sovernment. In the "equivalent" change crder,
the Government gets a reduction in the contract price,
because it is buying something less in value than originally
intended.
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(7) Eiii^lilil 3id to Average Bid Ratio. This
value, usually less than unity (unless there is only one
bidder)/ compares the relative difference between the
winning tid and the competitive average. The "competitive
average" excludes the winning tid in its computation and is
assumed to te a more realistic approximation of a construc-
tion project's "true" or market price. Therefore, a low
ratio would imply that a winning bid is priced far below
expected costs, and is prone to being a "buy-in" or a poten-
tially losing venture for the contractor.
(8) Winning Bid to Government Estim ate Eat io.
The use of this ratio for analysis assumes that the indepen-
dent Government estimate, also referred to as the "engi-
neer's estimate," is a fair price for the contract. The
relationship of change order rates to this ratio is another
focus of analysis.
t. Eesearch limitations
The availability of Scales of Bids and a source
for reliable Government estimates is clearly the most
limiting factor of this research. A reliable classification
code for the type of construction performed under each
contract was extremely limited. It is acknowledged that
certain types of construction, such as placement of under-
ground utilities, are inherently risky. Many projects
involve an aggregation of various construction trade disci-
plines, so it is difficult to make a single, inclusive clas-
sification for a contract, NAVTAC Facility Category Codes
[Eef- 35] are available in CHS for Military Construction
contracts only. However, Facility Category Codes categorize
contracts according to facility type rather than construc-
tion type. Table II summarizes the distribution of Military




MCON Contracts by Category Code
Facil ity Categci^ liMk§£ 21. Contracts






Hospital, Medical and Dental 7
Administration 8
Unaccompanied Personnel Housing 9
Community 3
Utilities and Ground Improvements 43
Total Military Construction Contracts
in Database 173
c. Other Data
For informational purposes. Figures 2.2 and 3.1
show the trends in various measures of construction industry
inflation and unemployment over Fiscal Years 1977 to 1982.
This information is extracted from periodical issues of
Engineering -Ne ws fiecord (EN E)
.
C) Construction Industry Inflation. Figure
3.1 plots ENR ' s Construction Cost Index (CCI) for three
major geographical areas pertinent to the database
contracts. The CCI is a measure of the combined effect of
wage and material price changes on the value of the
construction dollar. The year 1967 was established as the
base for an index value of 100. Tnis index is computed
monthly by ENR for twenty major U.S. metropolitan areas.
44
(2) Lf ne ir.ploYnie nt Hate. This rate is deter-
miaed quarterly by ZN R and is expressed as a national
average; no geographical distinctions are made.
(3) Small Business Set-Asides. NAVPAC
requires that all construction procurement in excess of
J2500 and under $1,000,000 shall be considered for Small
Business Administration (S3A) set-asides [Ref. 12: p.
4.2.13]. A small business set-aside is a procurement that
is eligible only for award to an SBA-certif led contractor.
Set-asides were created to encourage more commerce among
small, entreprenurial firms. Approximately 95 percent of
the database contracts are set-asides. The awarding of
set-asides has drawn some concern:
A dilemma to the Government posed by set-asides is that
in the short run, prices may be higher and competition
restricted as small businesses incur high start-up costs
and are unable to take advanta-j-e of economies or scale
to lessen costs. In the long run, however, the set-
aside program enlarges the total number of contractors
available to compete, and it should thereby contribute
to lower contract bids. [Ref. 37: p. 21]
B. ANALYTICAL COMPOTATIONS
The data were compiled for analysis on the IBM 3033A?
Computer at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California. The general purpose statistical computing
system, Minitab [Ref. 36], was used to perform various
computational functions for data organization and analysis.
The functions included:
• Sorting, rank-ordering, and receding of data.
• Mathematical calculations (averages, totals, standard
deviations, etc.).
• Histogram and plot construction,
• Regression analysis.
• Analysis of variance.
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!• Sorting,, Pan j^-crder iiig t and Recoding of Data
These features of Minitab are useful in examining
ranges of values, treakin g data into cells for variance
analysis, and isolating selected independent variables for
more detailed analysis. Variance and regression analyses
can b€ performed conveniently for selected geographical
areas, time frames, dollar ranges, facility types, and many
other desired classifications.
2. Mat hem atical Calculation s
Minitab enables simple calculations of averages,
totals and standard deviations of various data diversifica-
tions. Much of the summary data represented in this study
are the result of these calculations.
3. fiistoqram and Plot Construction
Ihis feature provides convenient display of data
distributions. Figure 3.2 displays the skewed distributions
ox change order rates for the database contracts. Plots
afford graphical displays of of relationships among vari-
ables. They are used, if necessary, in analysis of regres-
sion residuals to check the validity of the assumptions of
normality and constant variance of the residuals. Plots are
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y . Beqres si cn A ral^si
s
Eegression analysis is a useful tool for determining
relationships between a dependent variable and any number of
independent variables. The change order rate, as a depen-
dent variable, is examined for any significant relationship
to a number of independent variables, such as number of
bidders, the "spread," and bid-to-Government estimate ratio.
5 . Ana lys is of Variance
Through the use of analysis of variance, significant
differences among txc or more populations of data can be
tested. A statistical investigation can be made into the
comparison of chance order rates, for example, among
different classifications of geographical areas, award
periods, and bid-estinate ratios.
C. IINDINGS OF ANALYSIS
1 . Dependent Variable s
The objective of this analysis is to determine any
significant relationships through regression and variance
analyses between change order rates and other variables
available in the database. Two independent variables are
considered: the actual change order rate and the "eguiva-
lent" change order rate— a refined figure with the dampening
effect of deductive change orders removed.
2 • Independent Variabl es
The following are used as independent variables for
regression analysis:
• Number of Change Crders.
• Number of Bids.
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Actual Chan£e Order Rate
Eacli "? represents "2 oFservations
Middle of Number of
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• Number of Standard Deviations Between the Low Bid and
the Mean Bid.
• Winning Bid to Mean Bid Eatio.
• Winning Bid to Government Estimate Ratio.
• Percent Spread Between the Low Bid and the Next Lowest
Bid.
Subpopulations of the following variables were used
for exaiiining significant differences among change order
rates through variance analysis:
• Award Date Periods, by fiscal year and by fiscal
quarter
.
• Award Amount, in stepped ranges of various dollar amount
intervals.
• Geographical Area, by each of the eight categories, and
then into two categories— "metropolitan" versus "rural."
• Funding source, in three celis--Mili tary Construction,
Ncn-appropriated Funds, and Operations and Maintenance.
• Number of Bids, in various cells ranging from ore to 24
lids per contract-
• Winning Bid to Mean Bid Ratio, classified into 10 cells






• Winning Bid to Government Estimate Eatio, classified
into ten cells for all 300 contracts; and seven cells
for the 173 MCON contracts:






0.97 - 1.031.03-1,10 1.20 plus.
1. 10 - 1.19
1, 19 - 1,30
1.30 plus
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1. 10 - 1,20
• Uneaploymeiit Rate- classified into 13 cells representing
apprcximate construction industry unemployment rates
ranging from 9.0 to 18.5 percent over 20 quarters.
^ • freliminary. f inding s
a. Change Order Rates
The chance order rates for the data are shovn in
Table III. These rates are higher than the WESTDIV stan-
dards of six percent overall and five percent for Military
TABLE III
Change Order Bate Summary
Average Change Actual Equivalent





Construction contracts. The WESTDIV standards are predi-
cated upcn the annual Work in Place, however, and do not
account necessarily for all change orders to a given
contract. The figures above are representative cf a
slightly different criterion, that is, the total change
orders for each contract, including settlements tc claims
that may have lingered over a substantial period of the
contract life. WESTDIV has been more successful in control-
ling the overall change order rate than it has the .^CON
change order rate. The Command i'lanagement Plan standards
mentioned in Chapter II are high. The change order rates in
Table III, it is recalled, were adjusted to eliminate
deviant values. To make a more fair comparison between the
performances of CMP-tased change order rates and the change
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crder rates determined in this analysis, a number cf factors
would have to he considered in crder to put them on an even
plane. Such factors include the percentage of Work in Place
contracts actually ccapleted, and the average incidence rate
of change orders toward the end of the contract life.
h. Number of Bids Affecting tne "Spread"
Park [Ref. 15] asserts that the percentage
spread decreases as the number of bidders increases. The
evidence for this in this analysis is weak. The only
significant 1"' difference in the spread is between the group
cf 3 to 5 bidders and the group of 6 or more bidders. The
mean spread for the group of 3 to 5 bidders in the data is
13.2 percent, with a confidence interval between 10,1 and
16.
3
percent. The mean "spread" for the group of 6 or more
bidders is6.9 percent, with a confidence interval between
U.4 and 9.4 percent. These findings are based on only 169
contract observations, as the "spread" was not calculated
for contracts where there were three bidders or less.
^ • Findings of Regres sion Analysis
A series of stepwise regressions were performed on
each of the dependent variables against all considered inde-
pendent variables. No single variable emerged with a corre-
lation that was significant enough to explain the change
order rate. The measure of the proportion of total varia-
tion in a dependent variable that is explained by a regres-
sion line is the coefficient of determination, or
"r-squared" value. i® lach of the independent variables alone
failed to yield a coefficient above 6.0 percent. The best
1 'Based on a 95 percent confidence level.
isThe coefficient cf determination or "r-sguared" value
can range from zero, which denotes no correlation, tc unity,
which represents perfect correlation.
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fit found was a multiple regression of the bid-t o-Government
estimate ratio and the number of change orders against the
actual change order rate. Only an 8.2 percent coefficient
existed here with "t" ratios^^ for the bid-t o-Government
estimate and number of change orders equal to -4.64 and 2.87
respectively. Since the values of the coefficients of
deter ninaticn are so close to zero, the change order rate
explained by the independent variables is insignificant.
SubpopulatioDS of geographical areas, funding
sources and time frames failed to isolate any further data
that could provide useful regressions. Plots of change
order rates against each of the independent variables indi-
cated that little resemblance of a linear relationship
existed in any case. Figure 3.3, the plot of actual change
order rate versus bid-to-Go vernment estimate ratio, detcn-
strates this point.
5 . Fin din gs of Varianc e Analysis
In all analyses of variance, 95 percent confidence
intervals for level means were assumed in hypothesis
testing. One-way analyses of variance were performed for
each of the two independent variables (actual and "equiva-
lent" change order rates).
a. Award Date Periods
Two analyses of variance were performed: (1) by
fiscal year and (2) by fiscal year quarter. If improvements
have resulted in controlling change order rates due to
KESTCIV efforts, then significant differences in change
order rates should lie among the the five fiscal years. At
least a significant difference between 1978 and 1982 should
19^ "t" ratio should be at least plus or minus 2 to be
considered significant enough for an independent variable to









30.+ * ** 2 *
- * *** 3*** *
* 2 ****** * * *
* +324333 22224** 2 * *
* 2*24*46879+4+6564 ** * **
0,+ * ** *22 *63676++++2c742*223* ***
- *
-30.+ *
+ + + + —+—




Figure 3.3 Plot of Change Order Rate vs. Bid/Govt Est.
exist. The hypothesis is that there has been significant
improvement in reducing change order rates, and that it will
he demonstrated by a change order rate confidence interval
for 1982 that is below the lower limit of the confidence
interval for 1978.
There is a common perception that contracts
awarded in the fourth quarter tend to be "rushed" in the
attempt to award before the end of the fiscal year and that
the quality of specifications and drawings is therefore
sacrificed. If this true, then a significantly higher
change order rate should be seen for awards made during the
fourth quarter in contrast to the other quarters. This
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hypothesis will be affirmed if the lower limit of the fourth
quarter chanje order rate confidence interval is greater
than the upper confidence interval limits of the ether
quarters.
Analysis of variance for both cases reveals that
no significant differences in change order rates can be
found between any of the fiscal years or fiscal year quar-
ters. Iherefore, no improvement in reducing the WESTDIV
change order rate ever the five years was observed.
Although there was no statistical difference in the change
order rates among the four quarters, it was interesting to
note that the mean change order rate (both actual and
"equivalent") for contracts awarded during the fourth
quarter was the lowest.
b. Other Findings
Analyses of variance for amounts of award,
funding sources, number of bids, winning bid-to-mean bid
ratios. Category Codes, and unemployment levels revealed no
significant differences in change order rates among the
various cells-
c. Geographical Areas
Among the eight described geographical areas
there were no significant differences in change order rates
between any two areas. An analysis of variance clearly
shows that there is a significant difference in the change
order rate between construction contracts performed in
"rural" areas and these performed in the "metropolitan" or
high density areas. Rural areas incur lower change order
rates than do metropclitan areas. Figure 3.4 shows the 95
percent confidence intervals for each of these twc cells.
The upper limit of 7.1 percent for actual change order rate
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(based on a pooled standard deviation) for rural areas is
exceeded by the metropolitan areas' lower limit of 7,3
percent.
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Figure 3-4 Variance Analysis for Geographical Areas,
d. Winning Bid to Government Estimate Ratio
The most significant findings in the difference
among change order rates are found in the varying ranges of
this ratio. Generally, it is found that change order rates
tend to be high when the winning bid is proportionately
lower than the Government estimate. Conversely, change
crdk^r rates are significantly lower where the winning bid is
much greater than or very close to the Government estimate.
Figure 3.5 shows the 95 percent confidence intervals for
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Figure 3.5 Variance Analysis for Bid/Govt Estimate.
in Section C.2. of this chapter. There is a significant
difference in change order rates for both the actual and
"equivalent" change order rate between the ratio extremes.
The difference is significant between contracts where the
ratio is 84 percent and lower; and where the ratio is either
119 percent and higher or between 97 and 103 percent. Tvnere
the ratio is roughly between 3 and 16 percent on either side
of the Government estimate, no significant difference (at a
95 percent confidence level) in change prder rates can be
detected. One reason explaining why change order rates are
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significantly low where the winning bid is within three
percent of the Government estimate could he that these are
considered "clean," risk-free jobs, and the work and costs
involved are clearly discernatle by both the Government and
the contractor estimators.
This ratic may be of some use to the Contracting
Officer in assessing the level of competition for a
contract. If a contractor's bid is significantly lower than
the Government estimate (approximately 15 percent), the
likelihood cf high change order rates can be anticipated.
D. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
A database with recent construction contract information
was developed so that the principles introduced in Chapter
II could be challenged for validity. It was necessary to
make a number of refinements to the data so that various
external influences such as nonserious bids, peculiar
geographical characteristics, and terminated contracts t nat
distort any general trends in change order rates could be
eliminated.
A general statistical program, Minitab, was used to
calculate a number of analytical determinations. Chapter II
introduced the notion of competition intensity as a variable
that affects the profit margin that contractors apply to
bids. It is a general hypothesis of this thesis that as
competition intensity increases, winning bidders tend to be
contractors who are willing to assume greater risks than
their rivals. They apply lean profit margins to their bids
and expect change orders to ultimately improve their finan-
cial positions. The measures of competition intensity
introduced in Chapter.II, in addition to two measures intro-
duced by the author, are applied in the database analysis to
determine what conclusions can be drawn. Finally, the
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incidence of change ciders among varying classifications of
geografhical areas, time periods, price ranges, and unem-
ployment rates was examined.
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IV. SQMMMX ME CONCLgSIONS
A. SOflMAEY
The excessive use of change orders in GoverniDent
contracting has been alleged to he the result of impro^ier
diligence and care by management. The cnange order, in its
original conception, was intended to be a remedy for the
imperfections of contract language and depictions so that
Government and contractor parties could proceed in executing
the contract to a smooth end. Although change orders are
intended primarily as a convenience for the Government so
that "in-sccpe" modifications can be made to contract draw-
ings and specifications, there is some evidence that the
contractor has used change orders to his advantage. Ihe
intensity under which construction contracts are bid creates
a highly ccmpetitive environment that demands a careful
trade-off between a rational profit margin and a competitive
price in order to win and stay in business.
It has been suggested that the winners of
competitively-bid contracts are frequently contractors who
fall into several categories: (1) they enjoy the advantage
of economies of scale over their rivals, (2) they are mere
willing to assume certain risks, and (3) they see the oppor-
tunity to improve their financial positions, once the objec-
tive of winning the bid has been attained, by recouping
losses through change orders. The limits that govern the
extent to which contractors and contracting officers can use
contract language to resolve issues of contract ambiguities
in their favor have been defined through legal precedent.
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Seme of the theories and concepts of bidding strategy
were applied to a model of representative construction
contract data to test for their validities. Chapter II
introduced three conventional measures for intensity of
competition that were applied in the analyses. Bisk-takers
and "tuy-in" bidders presumably emerge as victors in the
bidding game under conditions of intense competition. For
this reason/ the number of bidders on a contract, the spread
between low bidder and next lowest bidder, and the
bid-to-Gcvernmen t estimate ratio were used in regression and
variance analyses to determine the validity of this state-
ment. Two other measures were introduced by the author for
use in analysis: tie bid-to-mean bid ratio and the number
of standard deviations of the low bidder from the mean bid.
Chapter III considered a nunber of predictive variables that
might help to explain the conditions that affect change
order rates.
It was necessary in the analysis to make several assump-
tions and refinements to the data. This was done so that
the data could be analyzed without the influence of outliers
to distort any general trends,
B. CCNCIOSIONS
Change orders do net appear to be influenced by any
dominant variable or combination of variables. There are
many miscellaneous factors, apparently randomly distributed
throughout the contract administration process, that
contribute to contract price growth. These factors include,
but are not limited to:
• Contracting officer and contractor expertise and compe-
tence.
• Availability of cccstruction materials and labor.
• Architect-engineer competency.
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• Ccntiactor business windfalls or failures en ether
concurrent jobs.
• Backlog of contracting officer paperwork.
The results of analysis were conclusive. No direct
relationship exists between the change order rate and any
simple ccinbinati on of variables. The most significant find-
ings for the variables that were considered lie ir the
change order rates among varying bid-to-Government estimate
ratios and geographical locations. Change order rates
appear to be higher when the contractor bid is at least 15
percent below the Government estimate. When the contractor
bid is very close (within three percent) to the Government
estimate, or when his bid is approximately twenty percent
above the Government estimate, change order rates are
significantly lower. This information may be useful to the
contracting officer in anticipating the magnitude of change
orders for a contract, since it is information readily
available at bid opecing.
There is a significantly lower change order rate for
construction contracts awarded for "rural" Naval activities
than there is for contracts awarded in metropolitan areas,
such as San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Seattle/Bremerton. The explanation for this is speculative,
but one may infer that "rural" contracts are "cleaner" or
that the intense bidding competition in the metropolitan
areas contributes to higher change order rates.
A discovery incident to the aim of this thesis was that
the change crder rate was remarkably similiar to the spread.
Cx the 169 contracts with U or more bidders, the actual
change order rate mean was 7,91 percent with a standard
deviation of 12.10. The mean spread was 9.36 percent with a
standard deviation of 13.06. These figures imply that
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statistically, for a 95 percent confidence level, there is
no significant difference between the two.
C. FOIOEE EESEARCH
The intent of this thesis was to identify variables that
significantly influence change order rates. Data was there-
fore refined so that general trends could be examined. One
obvious shortcoming in the analyses was in the consideration
given for the type (structural, electrical, mechanical,
earthwork, etc.) of construction and the effect it has on
the change order rate. Future research could explore this
variable for significant relationships in change order
occurrences.
There is coom for more study on the performance of goal
standards established in the NAVFAC Command Ilanagement Plan
for controlling change orders. Research could net only
determine how well the Engineering Field Divisions are
performing under these standards, but it could identify
where weaknesses exist. Such factors as geographical loca-
tion, construction type, or type of facility may be selec-
tively examined.
The analysis of bid spreads could determine when a
justifiable move should be taken to cancel and rebid for
contracts or when it is feasible to remain with a lew bidder




DESCRIPIION OF DATABASE VARIABLES
DATA GROUP 1
ColumE 1
CONTRACT NUMBER The number assi'jned by WESIDIV
prior to the Invitation forEids
\ 6-digit number ), identifying
the contract.
Column 2
AWARE EATE The date the contract was award-
ed by WESTDIV to the contractor.
(Year-Month-Day)
Column 3






:ied by ' 'line item
Column 4
GEOGRAPHY CODE The location of construction,
derived from the Unit Identifi-
cation Codes listed for each
contract in the CIS:
10 Metropolitan San Francisco
area.
11 Northern California/Nevada
area, excl. San Francisco
metropolitan area,
20 Metropolitan Seattle/Er em-
erton area.
21 Washington/Oregon area ex-
cluding Seattle/Bremerton.
30 Metropolitan Los Angeles
area .
31 Rural Los Angeles area,
incl. Ventura County.
40 Metropolitan San Diego
area.
41 Rural San Diego area, in-
cluding Arizona.
Column 5
NUMBEE OF BIDS The number of responsive and
serious bids submitted by con-




MEAN BID The average amount bid for each
contract, egual to:
Sum ox bid amounts per contract
'1
Number of bids per contract
Column 7
NUM3EE OF CHANGE OREEBS The jQumber of dollar-valued




GOVEENMENI ESTIMATE The independent estimate of con-
struction made by the Government
for work corresponding to the
ha.se bid and bid additives act-
ually awarded.
Column 2











The ratio of the winning bid to
the mean of bids for a contract.
Values close to unity indicate
relative closeness of the win-
ning bid to the competition
average.
Column 4
WINNING EID TO GOVERN-
MENT ESTIMATE RATIO
The ratio of the winning bid to
the Government Estimate. Values
above unity indicate a winninq





The actual change order rate ac-
counting for both additive and
deductive change orders, ex-
pressed as a percentage:
Final contract price
Original award amount




The change order rate adjusted
to dilute the effect of deduct-
ive change orders, and to ac-
count for the difference in the
final product from the original.
egual to:






= Finaj. contract price






CONIBACT NUMBER The number assigLed by WESIDIV.
(This number can be used as a
cross-reference for data in the
first two Data Groups.)
Column 2
SECOND LOWEST BID The amount submitted by the sec-





BID PEOM THE MEAN
The number of standard devia-
tions that the low bid for a
contract lies from the mean of
bids for that contract, ex-
pressed as:
(Mean bid - winning bid)
Standard deviation of bids
Column 4
BID SIRIAD The percentage of spread between
the winning bid and the second
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